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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CLIFFORD R. FRANCIS, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law- Appeal- Decisions Appealable.-An order 
denying application to withdraw plea of guilty is not appeal-
able. 
[2] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty.-Liberality in per-
mitting withdrawal of plea of guilty before judgment is ex-
pressly enjoined upon court by Pen. Code, § 1018. 
[3] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty.-Withdrawal of 
plea of guilty rests in sound discretion of trial court, and a 
denial may not be disturbed unless court has abused its dis-
cretion. 
[4] !d.-Plea-Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty.-While it would be 
better practice for court to hear evidence offered by defendant 
in support of motion to withdraw plea of guilty, it is not an 
abuse of discretion to deny motion without such hearing where 
such evidence is in probation report before court, and where 
considerable time has elapsed since entry of guilty plea. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Kurtz Kauffman, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for issuing checks without sufficient funds. 
Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
William W. Larsen and Ray L. Smith for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Alan R. 
\Voodard, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant was charged by information in 
two counts with passing two checks without sufficient funds 
"·ith the intent to defraud; both checks (one in each count) 
were passed on the same day, in the same place, Bennie's Club-
bouse, to different employees in that place and drawn on the 
same bank; one (count one) was for $60, the other (count two) 
for $25. He was also charged with a prior conviction and 
imprisonment for conspiracy to commit pandering. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 135; Am.Jur., Criminal Law, 
§ 286 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 1051; [2-4] Criminal 
Law, § 212. 
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Defendant with his counsel, Mr. Testa, pleaded not guilty 
to both counts on his arraignment on April 25, 1952, and trial 
was set for June 19, 1952. On June 3d, defendant substituted 
Mr. Larsen as his attorney in place of Mr. (What 
happened to Testa does not appear.) On the set for trial 
(June 19th) defendant and his counsel r~arsen requested and 
were granted a continuance to July 30th. On that date defend-
ant and his counsel asked and were permitted to withdraw his 
plea of not guilty to count one, and pleaded guilty to that 
count; he admitted the prior conviction; he waived time for 
sentence on that count and ~was granted leave to apply for 
probation. The hearing for probation, sentencing for count 
one, and disposition of count two were set for September 12, 
1952. The probation officer's report, recommending denial, 
was filed September 11th. On the 12th, defendant and counsel 
appeared and the matters to be considered at that time were 
continued at defendant's request to October 3, 1952. On that 
elate at defendant's request the hearing was continued to 
October lOth. On the lOth, defendant with his counsel moved 
to withdraw his plea of guilty to count one. That motion and 
the application for probation were denied and sentence was 
pronounced. Defendant thereupon gave notice of appeal. 
Thereafter defendant's motion to vacate the judgment and 
for permission to withdraw the appeal was denied. After 
probation was denied and judgment given, the second count 
was dismissed by the court on the motion of the prosecuting 
attorney in the "interest of justice." 
Defendant appeals from the judgment and the denial of 
his motion to \Yithdraw his plea. [1] Inasmuch as an order 
denying the application to withdraw the plea of guilty by the 
defendant is not appealable (People v. Shaffer, 130 Cal.App. 
749 [20 P.2d ; People v. Block, 134 Cal.App. 217 [25 P.2d 
242]; People v. Brickert, 3 Ca1.App.2d 474 [39 P.2d 450]; 
People v. Rarney, 135 Cal.App. 573 [27 P.2d 941] ; People v. 
Griffin, 100 Cal.App.2d 546 [224 P.2d 47]; People v. Tidwell, 
108 Ca1.App.2d 60 [238 P.2d 21] ; Pen. Code, § 1237) the 
appeal therefrom is dismissed. 
By way of amplification, the reporter's transcript of the 
rvents on September 12. 1952, when the continuance was 
gTanted. shows that drfendant 's counsel had read the 
report and wanted the eontinuance beeause of some 
remarks stated therein to have been made by his wife. No 
snggestion of withdrawal of the guilty plea was made then or 
on October 3d when a continuance was requested. 
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The same transcript shows that at the hearing on October 
lOth when defendant moved to withdraw his not guilty plea 
the motion was made under section 1018 of the Penal Code.* 
His counsel stated that it had not "occurred" to him until he 
read the probation report (which would have been September 
12th) and talked to defendant that the latter had given the 
probation officer a "complete denial and a full defense to the 
charge'' to which he had pleaded guilty. He offered to prove 
that if defendant could be sworn he would testify as he stated 
to the probation officer, that is, he thought he had made ar-
rangements to cover any possible overdraft and had no inten-
tion to issue a check without sufficient funds; that he would 
show mistake and inadvertence in making the guilty plea by 
affidavit or oral testimony. The probation report was offered. 
Counsel further stated that defendant had no intent to de-
fraud; that the guilty plea was entered by inadvertence and 
ignorance in that defendant did not know there had to be an 
intent to defraud__:__that if he had made arrangements to cover 
the check there would not be such intent. The district attor-
ney opposed the motion. 
The probation report shows defendant to have stated that 
''in explanation'' of the charge of insufficient funds he found 
it "difficult to explain." He was "reasonably certain" "the 
shortage would be taken care of at that time, however, through 
domestic problems I [he] failed to cover the shortage." He 
had no intent to defraud. In the past, Bennie's had held 
checks for a few days. He did not ask them to do so on the 
instant occasion but "hoped" they would. When he presented 
the checks he did not know for sure whether he had sufficient 
funds but had asked his wife to deposit to his account sufficient 
to cover them and thought she had done so. 
The court refused defendant's offer to support his motion 
and also the probation report. The report, however, had been 
filed in the court and the latter must have been familiar with 
its contents for it also considered at the September 12th hear-
ing the question of probation. The basis of the refusal was 
that defendant was delinquent in making his application to 
change his plea; that he had full opportunity to make it some 
*''On application of the dPfendant at any time before judgment the 
Ponrt may, and in case of a defendant who appeared without counsel at. 
the time of the plea the court must, for good cause shown, permit the 
plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted." 
''This section shall be liberally construed to effect these objects and 
to promote justice.'' (Pen. Code, § 1018.) 
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time before it was made and he offered no justifiable excuse 
for the delay. 
[2] As indicated by section 1018 of the Penal Code, 
supra, it must be liberally construed, that is, liberality in 
permitting a withdrawal of a plea of guilty before judgment 
is expressly enjoined upon the court. (People v. Griggs, 
17 Cal.2d 621 [110 P.2d 1031]; People v. Miller, 114 Cal. 
10 [45 P. 986]; In re Hough, 24 Cal.2d 522 [150 P.2d 448]; 
People v. Schwarz, 201 Cal. 309, 315 [257 P. 71].) [3] Also 
as stated in the above cited section the withdrawal of such a 
plea rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and a 
denial may not be disturbed unless the trial court has abused 
its discretion. (People v. Griggs, supra, 17 Cal.2d 621; cases 
collected 4 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 rev.), p. 599 et seq.) 
[4] While it would have been better practice for the court 
to have heard the evidence offered by defendant in support of 
his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty, the fact that this 
evidence was in the probation report which was before the 
court, and considerable time had expired since the entry of 
the guilty plea, we cannot say that the court abused its dis-
cretion in denying the motion. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
[Crim. No. 5460. In Bank. Feb. 26, 1954.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. REUBEN B. WEITZ, 
Appellant. 
[1] False Pretenses- Elements- Representation or Pretense-
Promise.-A promise made with intent not to perform it is a 
false or fraudulent representation or pretense within meaning 
of Pen. Code, § 484, defining theft. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., False Pretenses, § 4; Am.Jur., False Pretenses, 
§ 15 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1 J False Pretenses, § 7; [2] False Pre-
tenses, §37(1); [3] False Pretenses, §40; [4] False Pretenses, 
§ 36(8); [5] Criminal Law, § 786; [6] Embezzlement, § 78; [7] 
Forgery, §29(1); [8] Forgery, §7; [9] Forgery, §13; [10] 
Forgery, § 31; [11] Criminal Law, § 1404( 4). 
